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Abstract—We consider various security vulnerabilities of deploying Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) in smart grid,
and explore the issues related to confidentiality for customer
privacy and customer behavior as well as message authentication
for meter reading and control messages. There are only a very
few research work on AMI authentications, and no work exists
on confidentiality for user privacy and user behavior, from
the best of our knowledge. In this paper, we propose an innetwork collaborative scheme to provide secure and reliable AMI
communications in smart grid, with smart meters interconnected
through a multihop wireless network. In this approach, an AMI
system can provide trust services, data privacy and integrity by
mutual authentications whenever a new smart meter initiates
and joins the smart grid AMI network. Data integrity and
confidentiality are fulfilled through message authentication and
encryption services respectively using the corresponding keys
established in the mutual authentications. A transmission scheme
is proposed to facilitate the data collection and management
message delivery between smart meters and a local collector
for AMI communications. Simulation results show that the
proposed method has a better end-to-end delay and packet
losses comparing with a basic security method, and the proposed
method can provide secure and reliable communications for AMI
in smart grid systems.
Index Terms—Advanced metering infrastructure (AMI), multihop wireless network, security, smart grid

I. I NTRODUCTION
Smart grid delivers electricity between suppliers and consumers using two-way digital technology to control intelligent
appliances at consumers’ home or building to save energy,
reduce cost and increase reliability, efficiency and transparency
[1] [2]. Smart grid is characterized by a two-way flow of
electricity and information to create an automated, widely
distributed delivery network. It incorporates into the electricity
grid the benefits of communications to deliver real-time information and enable the near-instantaneous balance of supply
and demand [3] [4]. According to the Electric Power Research
Institute (EPRI), one of the emergent requirements facing the
smart grid development is related to cyber security of the
system. As indicated in the EPRI report [5], cyber security is
a critical issue due to the increasing potential of cyber attacks
and incidents against this critical sector as it becomes more
and more interconnected. Cyber security must address not
only deliberate attacks, such as from disgruntled employees,
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industrial espionage, and terrorists, but also inadvertent compromises of the information infrastructure due to user errors,
equipment failures, and natural disasters. Vulnerabilities might
allow an attacker to penetrate a network, gain access to control
software, and alter load conditions to destabilize the grid in
unpredictable ways.
Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) refers to systems
that collect, measure and analyze energy usage, from networks
that connected to next-generation electricity meters, or, smart
meters. An AMI includes software, hardware, communication
networks, customer-associated systems and meter data management (MDM) software. As the smart grid becomes reality,
security threats grow exponentially, from inside and outside
of the system. Utilities will almost certainly face substantial
liability claims and regulatory fines if inadequate security
technologies enable eavesdroppers, adversaries or hackers to
acquire and use AMI data to a customer’s detriment, or
worse, interrupt service or hold utility customers “hostage”.
Furthermore, if customers believe a utility is abusing personally identifiable data, or is generally collecting information
beyond what they deem acceptable (whether or not legal),
then they are likely to resist the implementation of AMI.
Consumers may refuse to consent (where required), hide their
data or pursue political opposition. Therefore, confidentiality
for user privacy and user behavior and authentication for meter
reading and control messages, are two of the major security
services need to be provided before an AMI can be deployed
in smart grid systems. From our recent survey on smart grid
communication infrastructures and on cyber security for smart
grid communications [6] [7], there are only a very few research
work on AMI authentications, e.g., [8]–[13], and no work
exists on confidentiality for user privacy and user behavior,
from the best of our knowledge.
In this paper, we develop an integrated confidentiality and
authentication scheme for secure and reliable AMI communications for smart grid systems. First, we develop a mutual
device authentication procedure for the proposed in-network
collaborative scheme which establishes the security key pairs
for AMI communications. Then we provide an in-network
collaborative scheme between smart meters and a local data
collector/dispersion point to fulfill the secure and reliable
communications for meter-reading collections and manage-
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A Smart Grid AMI Communication System Architecture

ment messages. We evaluate the performance of the proposed
secure and reliable in-network communication scheme through
simulations.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
provides a brief description of the smart grid AMI communication system model. Section III discusses briefly cyber
security requirements for AMI in smart grid. Section IV gives
the details of the proposed in-network collaborative communication scheme for AMI in smart grid. Section V presents
simulation results for the proposed in-network collaborative
communication scheme. Section VI draws the conclusion.
II. S MART G RID AMI C OMMUNICATION S YSTEM
A RCHITECTURE

of the whole smart grid system, then optimally adjust the
power generation, transmission and distribution according to
the power quality, and to smooth the peak demand and further
avoid the potential blackout at the utility side. The real-time
management messages will be distributed to corresponding
costumers backward to smart meters through the AMI system.
Therefore, the intelligent appliances re-schedule their tasks
and working periods accordingly to avoid the rush hours in
power demand and further to reduce the blackout chances at
the consumer side.
In the architecture shown in Fig.1, the communication
infrastructure for the low voltage electricity distribution network is usually implemented by wireless technologies such
as IEEE 802.11 Wi-Fi, for a group of terminal consumers.
For simplicity, each terminal consumer is considered to be
represented as a smart meter, and all the intelligent appliances
of a home is covered by a smart meter, i.e, a smart meter is
a home portal for AMI communications in smart grid. These
smart meters are connected to a feeder line which acts as
a gateway and leads the collected meter-reading to the local
management office at the back side of substation using IEEE
802.16 WiMax technology. At the local management office,
the smart meter-reading is recorded for individual customer
and aggregated to further forward to central SCADA for
system monitoring, demand managing, operation optimizing,
using dedicated fibre optical connections.
In Fig.1, the communication technology to be deployed
between smart meters and the feeder can be a multi-hop
wireless network, because wireless networking is the most
economical way to connect a group of distributed smart meters
in a community [16]. For a multi-hop wireless network, a
wireless backbone routing scheme can be formed to connect
the smart meters efficiently [17].
III. C YBER S ECURITY F OR AMI IN S MART G RID

Fig.1 shows a commonly used communication architecture
for smart grid AMI, which is generalized from the literature
[6] [7] [9] [11] [14].
The Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
systems have been implemented to monitor and control electrical power grids for decades [15]. The central SCADA manages
the electricity supply to substations on high voltage (> 230
KV) transmission lines. Usually, the handoff from high voltage
electricity transmission to middle voltage (11 KV) electricity
distribution for feeder lines takes place in substations. After
the voltage transformation at the end of the feeder line, a
consumer terminal can get the properly low voltage (110
V/220 V) electricity at home. At each home, the smart meter
collecting the electricity power consumption data from all
intelligent appliances at home online and send them back to
local management office of the utility company. Those data are
processed as billing information and aggregated, and then forwarded to SCADA for the utility operator. With this real-time
power consumption information from terminal consumers, the
utility operator can monitor and diagnose the on-line statues

Currently for AMI in smart grid communications, it lacks
sufficient work for security schemes including adequate authentication mechanisms. To the best of our knowledge, there
is no practical mechanism to meet the scalability problem of
the smart meter authentications. For example, to authenticate
a smart meter as a Home Area Network gateway (HAN GW),
another smart meter, a Building Area Network gateway (BAN
GW) should communicate with the HAN GW securely. This
communication needs to be encrypted with secret keys of BAN
and HAN GWs. Meanwhile, the BAN GW should be authenticated with the Neighboring Area Network gateway (NAN
GW) and the data flows among them should be encrypted as
well.
The cryptographic overheads such as the digital certificate
and signature take up a significant portion comparing to the
process of the data packet itself. In addition, cryptographic
operations also contribute to significant computational cost,
especially in recipient end, which verifies the message. In
smart grid, a smart meter typically send each meter-reading
message within an interval of 500 ms. Generating a digital
signature every 500 ms is not a serious problem for Public
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1) Device authentication: The identity and legality of the
smart meters and the associated consumers should be
verified before joining the interconnected smart meter
network and receiving the proper utility service.
2) Data confidentiality: The smart meter readings and management control messages should be kept in confidential
to conceal consumers’ privacy and utilities’ business
information from unauthorized entities.
3) Message integrity: The smart grid should be able to
verify that any meter-reading/management messages to
be delivered unaltered in AMI.
4) Maintaining secrecy: It should be ensured that some
secrecy of a smart meter will always keep in privacy
while some secrecy should be shared with particular
partners to build secure communications.
5) Prevent potential cyber attacks: A smart meter, by holding its own digital credential and following certain processes in the proposed in-network collaborative scheme,
should be guaranteed to obtain secure communication
connections with the smart meter network. Even if an
individual smart meter is compromised, the adversary
cannot use the compromised smart meter to further
access other smart meters’ information or take the advantage to penetrate the AMI in smart grid.

$XWKHQWLFDWLRQ
6HUYHU

,QLWLDOL]HG
6PDUWPHWHU
5HTXHVW__,'
1RWLILFDWLRQ__,'

$XWKHQWLFDWH
DXWKHQWLFDWLRQVHYHU
ZLWK.

$XWKHQWLFDWH
VXSSOLFDQW
ZLWK.

(. ,9 __N

*HQHUDWH
,9N

(. ,9 __N
*HQHUDWH

*HQHUDWH

ZLWKN

ZLWKN

kn−1,n

kn−1,n

&KDOOHQJH

5HVSRQVH
1RWLILFDWLRQ
$FNQRZOHGJH

Fig. 2.

Initialization Process for A Newly Boot-up Smart Meter

6) Facilitating communication overhead: Any security
scheme will bring additional system overhead especially
in communications. The proposed in-network collaborative communication scheme should be efficient in terms
of communication overhead and processing latency.

IV. A N I N - NETWORK C OLLABORATIVE C OMMUNICATION
S CHEME
In order to address the afore mentioned cyber security
threats, we have developed an in-network collaborative scheme
for AMI which can provide secure and reliable communications. The design objectives of the proposed in-network collaborative communication scheme is discussed in the following.

$XWKHQWLFDWRU

6XSSOLFDQW

Key Infrastructure (PKI) based digital signature schemes using
a regular personal computer nowadays. However, for a legacy
power grid system that connects hundreds of buildings, each
of which may have a large number of apartments, the number
of meter-reading messages that require to be verified by the
NAN GW might be significantly huger than its capacity.
In addition, the smart meters are vulnerable to various cyber
attacks found in the literature. The use of wireless and IP
technologies enable the online management facility meanwhile
make smart grid AMI communications more vulnerable to
cyber attackers.
Digital signing and verifying each message can certainly
achieve secure communications indeed. However, we find
the conventional cryptographic operations make such security schemes neither scalable nor affordable to the traffic
density and system resource constraints in smart grid. Since
most conventional security schemes such as PKI are not
adequate for the stringent requirement of smart grid AMI
communications. Consequently, we need to come up with
some light-weight but still secure enough verification schemes
tailored for the specific smart grid AMI communications so
the meter-reading collections and management messages can
be processed securely and fasterly.

A. Initialization Process
Fig.2 illustrates the initialization process for each newly
boot-up smart meter as a supplicant in the mutual authentication. Before joining the authenticated smart meter network,
it must be authenticated by the remote authentication server
located at the local management office as a legal device and
terminal customer. The neighboring authenticated smart meter
plays as a authenticator in the initialization process to convey
the authentication process message between the supplicant
and the authentication server. Both the supplicant and the
authentication server have an identical key 𝐾, which is never
concealed to anyone else including the authenticator. Because
both the mutual authentication identities and the consequent
data encrption/decrption between supplicant and authentication server are based on this 𝐾. If the supplicant’s identity is
authenticated as a valid device, the corresponding credential
of the supplicant is established between the authentication
server and the supplicant. Then, authentication server will
generate an initiate vector (IV) and a key 𝑘. The IV and
𝑘 will be encrypted by 𝐾, so the supplicant can decrypt
and get its IV and 𝑘. Meanwhile, the authentication server
sends the 𝑘 to the authenticator encrypted with their own
𝐾 ′ since authenticator was authenticated already with 𝐾 ′ .
So the authenticator know the 𝑘. With its 𝑘, the supplicant
and authenticator can generate the 𝑘𝑛−1,𝑛 individually then
conduct a four-way handshake procedure to fulfill another
mutual authentication between supplicant and authenticator.

911

0HWHULQJ
QRGH

After the successful mutual authentication, 𝑘𝑛−1,𝑛 at both
supplicant and authenticator sides are validated and ready for
the consequent message authentication code generation and
validation purpose.
Since every smart meter must fulfil the initialization process,
the back-end authentication server can collect all the necessary
topology information of the multihop wireless smart meter
network. The back-end server can generate the optimal routing
backbone as discussed in [17] and notify the correspond smart
meters on the existing backbone as well as the newly initiated
smart meter dynamically. In the rest of this paper, we examine
secure and reliable communications under the assumption that
a group of smart meters forms a route chain topology with
the orders node 1, node 2, ..., node n, and the collecting node,
which is a logic assumption from the studies in [17].

0HWHULQJ
QRGH

5
,9

.

0HWHULQJ
QRGHQ

5

M1

⊕

k1,2

(QFU\SW

&

.

5Q

Mn−1

⊕

⊕

kn −1,n

.Q

&

(QFU\SW

(QFU\SW


M1

M1

M1

M2

&

&

k1,2

k2,3



Mn

&

kn , n

&

B. In-network Meter-reading Collection Process
Fig.3 illustrates the encryption/decryption and message authentication process for meter reading collection in AMI environment. The smart meter node 1, which is at the beginning
of a route chain, conducts an XOR operation using its meterreading message in plain text with its own IV. Then, it uses the
result as the input of the encryption associated with its 𝐾1 to
generate the encrypted message 𝑀1 . The message authentication operation uses 𝑀1 and 𝑘1,2 to generate the corresponding
message authentication code which will be appended to 𝑀1 .
Then, both 𝑀1 and the corresponding message authentication
code will send to its neighboring smart meter node 2, the next
hop along the route to the collecting node.
The smart meter node 2 generates its own message authentication code with 𝑘1,2 and the received 𝑀1 . If the generated
message authentication code matches the received one, the
integrity of the received 𝑀1 is verified. Then, 𝑀1 is integrated
and run as the input of XOR operation with the meter reading
of smart meter node 2. The similar process takes place in all
the intermediate nodes in the route chain until it reach the
collecting node, which have all the 𝐾𝑛 in the route. After the
message authentication validated with the smart meter node
n, the collecting node can decrypt all the meter readings from
smart meter node 1 to smart meter node n on the route chain
at once.
The collecting node will aggregate the received meterreadings and forward these processed data through dedicated
lines or an overlay network to uplinks. All the meter-readings
on feeder lines are collected in local management office
where the real-time meter-readings are reordered for billing
purpose. Besides that, the information extracted from the
real-time meter-readings will be utilized not only by both
local management office and/or substation, but also by central
SCADA system operation.
C. In-network Management Message Distribution Process
Since the remote central SCADA and local management
office/substation will adjust the power generation, transmission
and distribution in smart grid according to the collected meterreadings. The management and control messages will be
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In-network Meter-reading Collection Process

distributed to specific smart meters to schedule the intelligent
home appliance operations correspondingly.
Fig.4 shows the reverse process flow comparing with Fig.3,
which can be used to cast the specific management messages
from collection node to particular smart meter nodes on the
chain topology route. We call our proposed AMI security
scheme the “in-network” security scheme since both the authentication and the encryption processes are performed hopby-hop in the communication route.
V. P ERFORMANCE E VALUATIONS
We evaluate the performance of our proposed in-network
collaborative communication scheme in AMI by simulations
using ns-2. In the simulation results shown here, we test
two scenarios, with 5-node and 10-node smart meters in the
route chain to the collecting node, and the collecting node is
equipped with a PC processor while each of the smart meter
nodes is associated with an ARM processor. The wireless
channel between any two neighboring nodes are under the
effect of shadow fading. The transmit power of nodes is set
to the minimum value that ensures successful transmissions
between only two immediate nodes so there is no interference
to other nodes. The uplink traffic due to meter-reading is
simulated by letting each meter node generating a constantbit-rate (CBR) session with destination to the collecting node
using UDP at the rate 1 packet/second with the packet size
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In-network Control Message Distribution Process

50 bytes. The encryption/decryption (SEED) and message
authentication code generation (HMAC) time consumption
listed in Table I is added to each smart meter node and the
back-end collecting node accordingly [18]. The simulation
TABLE I
M ESSAGE P ROCESSING T IME FOR ARM AND PC [18]
Process
SEED
HMAC

Processing time on ARM
19.23 𝜇s
23.63 𝜇s

End-to-end Delay (Second) vs. Hops Counts in 4 hops
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Processing time on PC
3.4 𝜇s
3.68 𝜇s

results from Fig.5 to Fig.8 illustrate the performance of the
proposed AMI “in-network” security scheme. On each of the
figures it also compares with the results of a basic security
approach that each of the smart meters will communicate to the
collecting node through a private key and an independent endto-end encryption (in which we call it “basic security scheme”,
or simply “basic scheme”). End-to-end delay is a crucial
performance parameter for real time applications such as online reading collection for electricity voltage, current, phase
and reactive power status in smart grid. If the data cannot
meet its end-to-end deadline, it will be useless for on-line
meter readings. Consequently it might cause serious system
fault especially in monitoring/protecting system for missing
the fault detection. While packet drop rate is another important

performance parameter for the system to make prompt and
proper decision based on the on-line real-time meter readings
and data collections.
Fig.5 and Fig.6 show that the proposed in-network security
scheme is superior to the basic security scheme as the hop
count increasing. The wireless interference is getting worse as
more and more wireless devices involved simultaneously, our
proposed approach can be arranged in a transmission schedule
for each participated smart meter at its initialization process.
Therefore, all the participated smart meters will transmit in a
pre-define order to avoid the interference in both transmitting
and receiving. So after all the participated smart meters finish
their own receiving and transmitting schemes without any
interference, the whole process is accomplished. That is why
our proposed approach can achieve identical low end-to-end
delay while the basic security scheme getting worse and worse
as the hop count increasing.
Fig.7 and Fig.8 shows the significant differences on packet
drop performance. The proposed in-network scheme can keep
in very low (almost 0%) packet drop rate while the basic
security scheme performance degrades dramatically as the hop
count increasing. It is beyond 20% as the hop count reaches
9 which is obviously impairing its operation of applications
such as on-line meter reading, monitoring and/or protecting.
VI. C ONCLUSION
As a critical part of the smart grid communication infrastructure, AMI is expected to face a variety of security
threats which not only targeting the smart meters in AMI,
but also impairing the reliability of smart grid operations. In
this paper, we investigate cyber security problems of deploying AMI in smart grid. In particular, we propose a secure
and reliable in-network collaborative communication scheme
for AMI in smart grid. Our proposed in-network approach
employs mutual authentications with a remote authentication
server located in local management and a neighboring smart
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meter as the authenticator to get the proper cryptography keys
for consequent secure data communications. Therefore, the
meter readings from smart meters and management messages
from central SCADA and/or local management office employ
encryption and message authentication mechanisms tailored
for both the security requirements and system constraints.
The performance of the proposed security scheme is verified
through simulations. We show that the proposed method has
a better end-to-end delay and packet losses comparing with a
basic security method, and the proposed method can provide
secure and reliable communications for AMI in smart grid
systems.
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